Terrorism and Voting: The Rise of Right-Wing Populism in Germany: Comment

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Abstract

Sabet, Liebald and Friebel (2025) find that successful, compared with failed, terror attacks raised the AfD vote share in German state elections by 4.5 percentage points and turnout by 14.7 points. In state elections, the comparison group effectively consists of two municipalities, whose declines drive both estimates. The AfD effect disappears when municipalities are compared within the same state election. The two controls' turnout declines are data errors; with official results, the turnout effect is small and insignificant. (JEL D72, D74)

1 Design

Sabet, Liebald and Friebel (2025, henceforth SLF) compare German municipalities hit by successful and by failed terror attacks between 2010 and 2020. $SUCCESS_i$ equals one if a municipality was ever hit by a successful attack and zero if all its attacks failed; $POST_{i,e,t}$ equals one for elections after the first attack. Their main model pools federal, European and state elections from 2013 to 2021:

$$AfD_{i,e,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 SUCCESS_i \times POST_{i,e,t} \times ELECTION_e + \Gamma X_{i,e,t} + \mu_{ie} + \tau_{te} + \varepsilon_{i,e,t},$$

with municipality-by-election-type (μ_{ie}) and year-by-election-type (τ_{te}) fixed effects. $X_{i,e,t}$ contains the lower-order terms, including $POST_{i,e,t} \times ELECTION_e$. For each election type, β_1 is therefore the post-attack change in successfully attacked municipalities minus the post-attack change in failed-attack municipalities. SLF find an effect only in state elections.

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2 Control units

The post-attack change in failed-attack municipalities is identified only by failed-attack municipalities observed in an election both before and after their attack. Table 1 counts them. Only 32 of the 232 attacks failed, and 11 of the 22 municipalities with a failed attack also had a successful one and count as treated. Of the remaining 11, ten are informative for federal elections and seven for European elections. For state elections, which follow state-specific calendars and feature the AfD only from 2013, two are: Ludwigshafen in Rhineland-Palatinate (failed Islamist bombing, November 2016) and Kremmen, a town of about 7,000 inhabitants in Brandenburg (failed arson attack, April 2017). Appendix Table 8 shows why the other nine drop out. The informative state-election comparison thus sets 35 successfully attacked municipalities, 80 percent of them in East Germany, against a West German city of 160,000 and a small East German town (Appendix Table 5).

Table 1: Municipalities identifying the effect, by election type

	Federal	European	State
Observations	370	246	118
Municipalities	124	123	59
successful attack	113	113	54
failed attacks only	11	10	5
Observed before and after the first attack			
successful attack	105	94	35
failed attacks only	10	7	2
States with such a failed-attack municipality	8	6	2

Notes: Estimation sample of SLF's Table 2 (AfD vote share, elections 2013–2021, singletons dropped). Only municipalities observed before and after their first attack in a given election type identify the post-attack change for that type. For turnout, the state-election sample has 51 such successfully attacked municipalities and the same two failed-attack municipalities.

Splitting β_1 into its two parts shows how much the state-election effects owe to the comparison group (Table 2). After a successful attack, the AfD share rises by 1.8 points and turnout by 2.4 points relative to the year effects, neither significantly. In Ludwigshafen and Kremmen, the AfD share falls by 2.7 points and turnout by 12.3 points, which accounts for about 60 and 85 percent of the published effects. Without these two municipalities, no failed-attack municipality is observed before and after its attack; the post-attack change for failed attacks then cannot be estimated, and Stata drops that term from the regression. The coefficient on $SUCCESS \times POST \times STATE$ remains in the output but then measures only the post-attack change in successfully attacked municipalities (Appendix Table 6).

Table 2: Post-attack changes in state elections, by attack outcome

	AfD vote share	Turnout
Successful attacks	0.018	0.024
	(0.023)	(0.026)
Failed attacks (Ludwigshafen and Kremmen)	−0.027	−0.123
	(0.019)	(0.018)
Difference (SLF's estimate)	0.045	0.147
	(0.011)	(0.018)
Informative municipalities: successful / failed	35 / 2	51 / 2

Notes: SLF's model re-parameterized so that the post-attack change in state elections is estimated separately for successfully attacked and failed-attack municipalities, each relative to the election-type-by-year effects; their difference equals SLF's coefficient (their Table 2, column 1, and Figure 5). Turnout uses elections from 2013. Standard errors clustered by municipality; for failed attacks they rest on two clusters.

3 Data errors

The election data in the replication package contain errors that affect both control municipalities, most of the successfully attacked ones, and the 2017 federal election. Appendix A documents them in detail; this section summarizes them.

Source of the state-election data. SLF take municipal state-election results up to 2019 from the Regional Database of the federal and state statistical offices; a fresh download confirms that the package files are unaltered copies. The database's own footnote states that municipal results for Baden-Württemberg, Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and Thuringia exclude postal voters, whose votes appear only in county and state totals. In practice the exclusion is applied inconsistently over time: comparing municipal sums with state totals, the turnout shortfall is 1.1 points in Brandenburg in 2014 but 11.6 points in 2019, and it grows from 8.2 to 14.9 points in Saxony. Because postal voting rose over the period, and postal voters vote less often for the AfD, such shifts lower measured turnout gains and raise measured AfD gains. The package files were exported in March 2021, before that year's state elections, so SLF collected the 2021 results separately; the package contains neither these raw data nor the code that processed them, and the README's links do not match the states concerned.

The two control municipalities. Both controls' turnout declines are artifacts. Kremmen's 2019 result omits postal votes, which its 2014 result includes: officially, Kremmen's turnout rose from 47.5 to 60.1 percent, while the data show a fall to 45.0 percent, and its

2019 AfD share was 25.1 rather than 27.2 percent. Ludwigshafen's 2021 observation is not the city but constituency 36, which covers about half of it: its eligible voters and party votes match that constituency's official result exactly (48,495 eligible voters, against 100,442 in the city), and its variable for valid votes holds the number of voters. Officially, the city's turnout fell from 63.3 to 52.6 percent rather than to 47.6 percent, and the AfD received 12.5 rather than 11.8 percent (Appendix Table 4).

The successfully attacked municipalities. Of the 35 successfully attacked municipalities that identify the state-election effect, only the six in Hesse are measured consistently. In Saxony (15) and Thuringia (6), the share of postal votes excluded grows between the 2014 and 2019 elections. In Brandenburg (2), coverage switches as in Kremmen; in Nauen, official 2019 turnout was 52.2 percent against 41.6 percent in the data. In Saxony-Anhalt (3), the 2016 figures exclude postal votes while the separately collected 2021 figures appear to include them. In Berlin (2), the 2021 data report 3.31 million eligible voters across the twelve districts, against 2.49 million in 2016. These errors run in different directions; correcting them all would require municipal results that allocate postal votes, as the German Election Database (GERDA) does.

Other errors. The 2017 federal election results do not measure municipalities: for attacked municipalities they average 860 eligible voters, against 111,000 in 2013, and appear to come from single polling districts. The 2021 Baden-Württemberg election is missing entirely, as are the AfD shares for the 2017 Schleswig-Holstein election and the 2019 result for Artern/Unstrut. Finally, the code dates the first attack from the first failed attack in five municipalities that had an earlier successful one; correcting this leaves the state-election coefficient unchanged.

4 The state-election effects disappear with state-by-year fixed effects

Table 3 re-estimates SLF's model with alternative inference, with state-by-year fixed effects, and with official results for the two control municipalities.

Inference on the AfD effect is fragile. The clustered standard error implies a p-value below 0.001; the restricted wild cluster bootstrap gives 0.13 (0.15 with Rademacher weights), the unrestricted version below 0.001, and SLF's working paper reports 0.004 for the bootstrap and below 0.001 for a permutation test. With two clusters carrying the control-group variation, none of these procedures is reliable: the restricted bootstrap tends to be conservative

Table 3: Effects of successful attacks by election type

	Municipality-by-type and type-by-year FE				Additionally state-by-year FE			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Control data	Federal	European	State	State official	Federal	European	State	State official
A. AfD vote share								
$SUCCESS \times POST$	0.001	−0.012	0.045	0.052	−0.002	−0.006	−0.011	−0.001
	(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.024)	(0.022)
	[0.98]	[0.68]	[0.13]	[0.20]	[0.89]	[0.73]	[0.72]	[0.98]
B. Turnout								
$SUCCESS \times POST$	−0.034	0.022	0.147	0.046	−0.040	−0.015	0.104	−0.009
	(0.029)	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.042)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.033)
	[0.31]	[0.43]	[0.09]	[0.66]	[0.03]	[0.43]	[0.06]	[0.87]

Notes: Each panel and set of fixed effects is one regression of SLF's model (their equation 2), pooling all election types; columns give the coefficient for each type. Columns 1–4 use SLF's fixed effects (municipality by election type, election type by year); columns 1–3 reproduce their Table 2, column 1, and Figure 5. Columns 5–8 additionally include state-by-election-type-by-year fixed effects, which compare only municipalities voting in the same election. Columns 4 and 8 repeat the state-election estimate after replacing the erroneous observations of the two control municipalities with the official results (Ludwigshafen 2021: city-wide turnout 0.526, AfD 0.125; Kremmen 2019: turnout 0.601, AfD 0.251; Section 3). Federal coefficients use SLF's 2017 federal data, which do not measure municipalities (Section 3). Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses. Brackets: p-values from a restricted wild cluster bootstrap (null imposed, Webb weights, 9,999 draws, clustered by municipality). Turnout (votes per eligible voter) uses elections from 2013.

and the unrestricted one to over-reject (MacKinnon and Webb 2018). SLF's leave-one-out exercise cannot detect the dependence either, because dropping one municipality leaves the other control in place.

The estimate itself depends on comparing municipalities across states. The year-by-election-type fixed effects compare, for instance, Saxon municipalities with Kremmen in Brandenburg, so state-specific AfD trends enter the estimate; SLF's control for East Germany interacted with year (their Table 2, column 2) addresses only the broadest of these differences. State-by-year fixed effects restrict all comparisons to municipalities voting in the same state election. Because only Brandenburg and Rhineland-Palatinate have an informative failed-attack municipality, this specification mainly compares successfully attacked municipalities with other attacked municipalities in the same state that were attacked at a different time. In that comparison, successful attacks are not followed by a rise in the AfD share: the estimate is −0.011 (column 7). SLF's comparison with propensity-matched untargeted municipalities shows the same pattern, falling from 0.030 to 0.009 with state-by-year fixed effects (Appendix Table 7).

SLF's event study (their Figure 3) appears to show a rise in the AfD share after successful attacks. Figure 1 re-estimates it with the Sun–Abraham estimator. In SLF's specification

the average post-attack effect is 0.032 (0.013); with the fixed effects of SLF's own Table 2 it is 0.002 (0.006), and with state-by-year fixed effects −0.000 (0.007). Dropping Ludwigshafen and Kremmen changes none of these averages noticeably. The original specification has a compositional problem. It counts event time in elections of all types and uses municipality and election-position fixed effects, so each event-time bin mixes federal, European and state elections, and the mix shifts sharply across bins: among successfully attacked municipalities, the reference period consists mostly of European elections (60 of 104 observations), the first post-attack period mostly of federal elections (80 of 112). AfD shares differ by election type (10.7, 11.6 and 14.7 percent on average in European, federal and state elections) and rose over calendar time, so these shifts load onto the event-time coefficients. The raw vote shares show no differential rise: between the last election before and the first after the attack, the mean AfD share rises from 9.3 to 15.7 percent in successfully attacked municipalities and from 10.7 to 15.3 percent in failed-attack municipalities (Appendix Figure 2). The same applies to SLF's separate event studies for successful and failed attacks (their Figure D.3).




Figure 1: Event study of the AfD vote share

Notes: Sun–Abraham interaction-weighted estimates with 95 percent confidence intervals; standard errors clustered by municipality. All election types pooled; event time counted in elections relative to the first attack; failed-attack municipalities form the never-treated cohort; reference period −1; endpoints binned. SLF specification: municipality and election-position fixed effects, as in their Figure 3. State-by-year fixed effects: municipality-by-election-type and state-by-election-type-by-year fixed effects. Cohorts are defined by the election in which a municipality is first treated; defining them by the calendar year of the attack, as SLF do, gives average post-attack effects of 0.030 (0.011), −0.004 (0.008) with SLF's Table 2 fixed effects, and 0.004 (0.007) with state-by-year fixed effects.

The turnout effect survives state-by-year fixed effects (column 7) because it rests on the

controls' erroneous turnout declines described in Section 3. With the official results for Ludwigshafen and Kremmen, it falls to 0.046 with SLF's fixed effects (bootstrap $p = 0.66$) and to -0.009 with state-by-year fixed effects (columns 4 and 8). The same correction raises the AfD effect with SLF's fixed effects to 0.052 (bootstrap $p = 0.20$), because Kremmen's official AfD gain is smaller than in the data, but leaves it at zero with state-by-year fixed effects. These columns correct only the two controls; the errors affecting most successfully attacked municipalities remain. An event study of turnout pooling all election types shows the same compositional pre-trends as for the AfD share in SLF's specification and a small average post-attack effect with state-by-year fixed effects (Appendix Figure 3).

5 Conclusion

SLF's state-election effects compare successfully attacked municipalities with two failed-attack municipalities. Within state elections, successful attacks are not followed by a rise in AfD support, and the turnout effect is driven by measurement errors in the two controls. The municipal evidence does not establish that terror attacks raised AfD support or turnout in state elections.

References

[1] MacKinnon, James G., and Matthew D. Webb. 2018. "The Wild Bootstrap for Few (Treated) Clusters." *Econometrics Journal* 21 (2): 114–35.

[2] Sabet, Navid, Marius Liebald, and Guido Friebel. 2025. "Terrorism and Voting: The Rise of Right-Wing Populism in Germany." *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy* 17 (3): 407–40. `https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20230615`. Replication package: `https://doi.org/10.3886/E208722V1`.

A Election data

Source. SLF take municipal state-election results up to 2019 from the Regional Database of the federal and state statistical offices (tables 143xx-01-03, one per state). The files in the replication package were exported on 5 March 2021. Downloading the same tables again and comparing them row by row shows that the package files are unaltered copies (14 of 16 tables could be retrieved; all values for the elections in the package are identical). Because the export predates the 2021 state elections, SLF collected the 2021 results for Rhineland-Palatinate, Berlin, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and Saxony-Anhalt separately from state websites; the code for this step is not in the package.

Postal votes. The database's footnote to these tables states that municipal results for Baden-Württemberg, Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and Thuringia exclude postal voters, whose votes are included only in county and state results. In practice, this is not applied consistently over time. Summing municipal voters within a state and comparing them with the state total gives a turnout shortfall of 1.1 points in Brandenburg in 2014 but 11.6 points in 2019, 0.8 and 5.6 points in Saxony-Anhalt in 2011 and 2016, and 8.2 and 14.9 points in Saxony in 2014 and 2019; in North Rhine-Westphalia, Hesse, Rhineland-Palatinate and the Saarland it is below 0.1 points. Where coverage changes between elections and postal voting grows, measured municipal turnout falls even when actual turnout rises.

Kremmen. Kremmen belongs to the Brandenburg constituency Oberhavel I, which consists of five municipalities. Their summed figures in the Regional Database match the official count of voters in 2014 (23,589 against 23,596), when postal votes were included, but fall short by 7,299 in 2019 (24,251 against 31,550), almost exactly the 7,303 postal voters recorded in the constituency in 2019 (Table 4). Official turnout in the constituency rose from 43.8 to 57.6 percent. Kremmen itself is not part of an *Amt*, so its postal votes are counted and reported for the municipality: officially, 60.1 percent voted in 2019 and the AfD received 25.1 percent of list votes, against 45.0 and 27.2 percent in the data (Landeswahlleiter Brandenburg, results by *Amt* and municipality). Kremmen's measured fall from 47.5 to 45.0 percent therefore compares a count that includes postal votes with one that does not; the official change is +12.6 points.

Ludwigshafen. The package documents no source for the 2021 Rhineland-Palatinate results; they appear only in the processed state-election file. Ludwigshafen's 2021 observation reports 48,495 eligible voters, against 103,001 in 2016. Its eligible voters and party votes

coincide exactly with the official result for constituency 36, Ludwigshafen am Rhein I, which covers about half of the city (for example, 2,730 AfD and 8,401 SPD list votes). In addition, the variable for valid votes holds the number of voters (23,082 rather than 22,808 valid list votes), so the 2021 vote shares are computed over all voters. According to the official city-wide result, 52,785 of 100,442 eligible voters voted (52.6 percent, against 63.3 percent in 2016), and the AfD received 12.5 percent of valid list votes (19.9 percent in 2016). The data instead show 47.6 percent turnout and an AfD share of 11.8 percent. Using the official city-wide figures for Ludwigshafen alone changes SLF's state-election estimates from 0.045 to 0.041 for the AfD share and from 0.147 to 0.123 for turnout; the remaining turnout effect reflects mainly Kremmen.

Successfully attacked municipalities. The measurement problems are not confined to the controls. Of the 35 successfully attacked municipalities that identify the state-election effect, only the six in Hesse are measured consistently. In Saxony (15) and Thuringia (6), municipal results exclude postal votes in both elections, but the excluded share grows between 2014 and 2019 (in Saxony from 8.2 to 14.9 points of turnout), which understates turnout gains and, because postal voters vote less often for the AfD, overstates AfD gains. In Brandenburg (2), coverage switches as in Kremmen: in Nauen, official 2019 turnout was 52.2 and the AfD share 27.7 percent, against 41.6 and 29.4 percent in the data; the other municipality belongs to an *Amt*, whose postal votes are not reported by municipality. In Saxony-Anhalt (3), the 2016 figures exclude postal votes while the separately collected 2021 figures appear to include them (the 2021 data sum to a state turnout of 60.3 percent). For Berlin (2), the 2021 data report 3.31 million eligible voters across the twelve districts, against 2.49 million in 2016, and measured turnout falls by about 11 points in every district. These errors run in different directions, and correcting them all would require municipal results that allocate postal votes, as the German Election Database (GERDA) does. Correcting Nauen in addition to the two controls changes the estimates in Table 3, columns 4 and 8, little (AfD 0.051 and -0.004, turnout 0.048 and 0.011).

Other data issues. The 2017 federal election results in the package do not measure municipalities: for attacked municipalities they average 860 eligible voters, against 111,000 in 2013 and 101,000 in 2021, and across all municipalities they sum to 6.4 million eligible voters. They appear to come from single polling districts. Dropping the 2017 federal election changes the average post-attack effect in SLF's event-study specification only from 0.032 to 0.028. The 2021 Baden-Württemberg election is missing entirely, as are the AfD shares for the 2017 Schleswig-Holstein election and the 2019 result for Artern/Unstrut. The README's links

for the 2021 state results do not match the states named (two point to Saxony-Anhalt, one to a 2017 election), and none covers Rhineland-Palatinate.

Table 4: State-election results in the two control municipalities: package data versus official results

	Package data		Official	
	Before	After	Before	After
Kremmen, state elections 2014 and 2019				
Turnout, Kremmen	0.475	0.450		0.601
AfD share, Kremmen	0.125	0.272		0.251
Turnout, constituency Oberhavel I	0.438	0.442	0.438	0.576
Voters, constituency Oberhavel I	23,589	24,251	23,596	31,550
Postal voters, constituency Oberhavel I			5,254	7,303
Ludwigshafen am Rhein, state elections 2016 and 2021				
Eligible voters	103,001	48,495	103,001	100,442
Turnout	0.633	0.476	0.633	0.526
AfD share of valid list votes	0.199	0.118	0.199	0.125
Turnout, constituency 36 / 37				0.476 / 0.572

Notes: Package data for Oberhavel I are sums over its five municipalities in the Regional Database. Package data for Ludwigshafen in 2021 equal the official result for constituency 36. Official: Amt für Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg, *Landtagswahl 2019 im Land Brandenburg, Endgültiges Ergebnis*, table 3.7; Landeswahlleiter Brandenburg, Landtagswahl 2019, second-vote results by *Amt* and municipality (wahlergebnisse.brandenburg.de); Landeswahlleiter Rheinland-Pfalz, *Die Wahl zum 18. Landtag Rheinland-Pfalz am 14. März 2021, Endgültige Ergebnisse, Teil 1*, table T7 and results for Ludwigshafen am Rhein.

B Additional results




Figure 2: Mean AfD vote shares by event time

Notes: Unweighted mean AfD vote share across municipality-election observations, with 95 percent confidence intervals for the mean. All election types pooled; event time counted in elections relative to the first attack, as in SLF's event study (their Figure 3); endpoints binned. Successfully attacked municipalities: 42 to 117 observations per period; failed-attack municipalities: 4 to 13.

Table 5: Baseline characteristics of the municipalities informative for state elections

	Successful attack	Ludwigshafen	Kremmen
AfD share, 2013 federal	0.058	0.065	0.058
AfD share in state, 2013 federal	0.060	0.049	0.059
Population, 2012 (000s)	80.4	160.2	7.1
East Germany	0.80	0	1
Urban district	0.20	1	0
Municipalities	35	1	1

Notes: Municipalities observed in a state election before and after their first attack; the first column gives means over the 35 successfully attacked ones. Characteristics are measured at the same date for every municipality (2013 federal election, 2012 municipal statistics). State-level AfD share computed from all municipalities of the state.

Reproduction. All results use the authors' processed data. Estimates in SLF's specification use their Stata code; the wild cluster bootstrap uses `boottest`; the event studies use the fixest package in R, because SLF's `xtevent` implementation could not be run here.




Figure 3: Event study of turnout

Notes: As Figure 1, with turnout (votes per eligible voter) as the outcome and elections from 2013, as in SLF's turnout regressions. Average post-attack effects: 0.063 (0.013) in SLF's specification and 0.021 (0.011) with state-by-year fixed effects; with the official results for Ludwigshafen and Kremmen, 0.060 (0.013) and 0.015 (0.011). In SLF's specification, the pre-attack coefficients reach 0.069 because the reference period consists mostly of European elections, in which turnout is lowest.

A minor coding error dates *POST* from the first failed rather than the first attack in five municipalities; correcting it leaves the state-election coefficient unchanged.

Table 6: Sensitivity of the state-election estimates to the two control municipalities

	(1) Baseline	(2) Without Ludwigshafen	(3) Without Kremmen	(4) Without both	(5) Elections from 2010
A. SLF's parameterization					
AfD vote share	0.045	0.051	0.038	0.017	–
	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.024)	
Turnout	0.147	0.142	0.152	0.025	0.023
	(0.018)	(0.010)	(0.033)	(0.027)	(0.029)
B. Post-attack changes entered separately for successful and failed attacks					
AfD vote share	0.045	0.051	0.038	n.i.	–
	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.018)		
Turnout	0.147	0.142	0.152	n.i.	0.023
	(0.018)	(0.010)	(0.033)		(0.029)
Informative failed-attack municipalities	2	1	1	0	8

Notes: Coefficient on $SUCCESS \times POST \times STATE$ in SLF's model. In column 4 no failed-attack municipality is observed before and after its attack in a state election; the post-attack change for failed attacks then cannot be estimated and Stata drops that term. In panel A the coefficient then measures the post-attack change in successfully attacked municipalities. Panel B enters $POST \times SUCCESS \times STATE$ and $POST \times (1 - SUCCESS) \times STATE$ as separate regressors and reports their difference only when both are estimated (n.i. = not identified). Column 5 adds the 2010–2012 elections (turnout only, as the AfD did not yet exist). Standard errors clustered by municipality; in columns 2 and 3 they rest on one control cluster.

Table 7: Successfully attacked versus propensity-matched untargeted municipalities (SLF Table 3)

	Year fixed effects	State-by-year fixed effects
AfD vote share	0.030	0.009
	(0.013)	(0.010)
Turnout	0.048	0.011
	(0.025)	(0.012)

Notes: SLF's alternative comparison group: each successfully attacked municipality is matched by propensity score to two municipalities without any attack, which are assigned the post-attack timing of attacks in their county. The coefficient is the state-election effect of a successful attack relative to these matched municipalities, of which 25 are observed before and after the assigned attack date. First column: SLF's model; the AfD estimate reproduces their Table 3, column 3. Second column: state elections only, with municipality and state-by-year fixed effects. Turnout uses elections from 2013. Standard errors clustered by municipality.

Table 8: Failed-attack municipalities in state elections, 2013–2021

Municipality	First attack	Why (not) informative
Wuppertal, Bonn, Gelsenkirchen	2012–2020	One AfD-era election (2017)
Nuremberg	Aug. 2019	One AfD-era election (2018)
Artern/Unstrut	Apr. 2017	2019 result missing from data
Heidelberg, Berlin Marzahn-Hellersdorf, Godendorf, Sanitz	2014–2015	Attacked before first AfD-era election
Ludwigshafen am Rhein	Nov. 2016	Informative (2016 pre, 2021 post)
Kremmen	Apr. 2017	Informative (2014 pre, 2019 post)

Notes: The eleven municipalities whose attacks all failed. Informative means observed in a state election from 2013 both before and after the first attack.